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Abstract
A new clusters labelling strategy, which combines the
computation of the Davies-Bouldin index of the clustering
and the centroid diameters of the clusters is proposed for
application in anomaly based intrusion detection systems
(IDS). The aim of such a strategy is to detect compact clus-
ters containing very similar vectors and these are highly
likely to be attack vectors. Experimental results compar-
ing the effectiveness of a multiple classifier IDS with such
a labelling strategy and that of the classical cardinality la-
belling based IDS show that the proposed strategy behaves
much better in a heavily attacked environment where mas-
sive attacks are present. The parameters of the labelling
algorithm can be varied in order to adapt to the conditions
in the monitored network.
1. Introduction
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are security tools de-
signed to detect and classify attacks against computer net-
works and hosts. They can operate in two ways: either by
searching for specific patterns in data (misuse based IDS) or
by recognising certain deviations from expected behaviour
(anomaly based IDS). In anomaly based IDS, clustering al-
gorithms are often used for recognition of ”abnormal” be-
haviour. They can be applied either directly on incoming
data [6, 9, 18] or as a supporting technique in a stage poste-
rior to data classification performed by means of other tech-
niques [12, 24].
Anomaly based IDS classify input data into a number
of categories, or classes. This number can be arbitrary, but
as the essential goal of these systems is to distinguish be-
tween ”normal” and ”abnormal” behaviour, it is very com-
mon to partition the incoming resource access requests into
two classes that correspond to these two types of behaviour.
The data are submitted to the system in the form of lists
created at predefined time intervals or alternatively, upon a
predefined number of incoming requests. Then the system
makes the decision about whether abnormal behaviour oc-
curred or not, based on the obtained classification results.
In this paper, we consider the Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attack scenario in which attack resource access requests ar-
rive to the monitored network in bursts. An anomaly based
IDS interprets this situation in the following way: If it anal-
yses N resource access requests at a time then more than
N/2 of these requests correspond to attacks. We call such a
scenario a massive attack. Sometimes, other network mon-
itoring tools (firewalls etc.) can detect such attacks, but the
advantage of an anomaly based IDS regarding all kinds of
attacks (including massive attacks as defined in this paper)
is in the capability of detecting a completely new attack.
If clustering is used for classification of resource access
requests in an IDS, the main problem is the interpretation of
clustering results, so called ”labelling” of clusters. Namely,
without additional information (which is, by contrast, al-
ways present in the systems with learning) it is difficult to
decide whether the data classified in one cluster correspond
to ”normal” behaviour in the monitored network or to ”ab-
normal” behaviour. Cardinalities of clusters are often used
as a decision parameter for this purpose (see, for example,
[18]) because the mathematical expectation of ”normal” be-
haviour is considered greater than that of ”abnormal” be-
haviour. However, this approach has some serious draw-
backs and fails to detect massive attacks. Solving this prob-
lem requires a more complex clusters labelling algorithm.
We propose a clusters labelling strategy based on a com-
bination of clustering evaluation techniques. The Davies-
Bouldin clustering evaluation index and the comparison of
centroid diameters of the clusters are combined in order
to respond adequately to the properties of attack vectors.
We consider the compactness of the corresponding clusters
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and the separation between them the principal parameters
that distinguish ”normal” from ”abnormal” behaviour in the
analysed network. Because of that, clustering evaluation
techniques that take into account these parameters are ap-
plied in our IDS. We found the Davies-Bouldin index the
most convenient measure that can be used for labelling clus-
ters in IDS. In the experiments, we test the response of a
multiple classifier IDS (see, for example, [7]) with the new
labelling strategy implemented to artificial data and express
the IDS quality through Receiver Operating Characteristics
(ROC) curves. The effectiveness of our IDS is compared
with that of a system of the same kind implementing the
classical clusters cardinalities based labelling algorithm.
In the experiments, we tested our labelling algorithm on
the well known KDD CUP artificial data set [5, 13], which
was used as the traffic source. Although this source has been
criticized in the literature (see, for example, [15, 23]), it is
still being used for IDS benchmarking [1, 8, 17]. We found
it convenient as a source of massive attacks, against which
we have tested our labelling strategy. The experimental re-
sults show that the labelling strategy proposed in this paper
works well even in a heavily attacked environment to which
the KDD CUP data set corresponds and because of which
(as one of the reasons) it has been criticized as being ”unre-
alistic”.
The structure of the paper is the following: In Section
2, a general description of the analyzed intrusion detection
system is given. In Section 3, the new clusters labelling
method combining the Davies-Bouldin index and the cen-
troid diameters comparison is described in detail. In Sec-
tion 4, the experimental work is described and the results of
the experiments are given. Finally, Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2. General description of the system
The multiple classifier IDS, whose elements we analyze in
this paper, consists of the following components (Fig. 1):
1. K sensors, P1, . . .PK, which operate in parallel on
the same data set Xτ , τ = 0, 1, 2, . . . We limit our-
selves to the case in which every sensor is merely a
clustering algorithm that classifies the input data set
into K clusters, without any interpretation of cluster-
ing results.
2. L assessors,A1, . . . ,AL, whose task is to ”label” the
clusters obtained from the sensors, upon processing
the current data set Xτ . For this to be carried out,
every assessor calculates the value of its own crite-
rion function for every sensor over the data setXτ . A
local extreme value (maximum or minimum) of this
function determines the decision of the assessor on
the following: an element of Xτ belongs to a cluster
that is interpreted as one of the ”normal” clusters or it
belongs to a cluster that is interpreted as the ”abnor-
mal” one.
3. The manager of the system adjusts the parameters of
the sensors and the assessors in order to maximize the
effectiveness of the system as a whole.
Figure 1. A multiple classifier IDS
In this paper, we concentrate on the basic sensor-
assessor structure. The former actually performs the clus-
tering of the incoming resource access requests, whereas the
latter performs the clustering quality evaluation.
We have selected the well known K-means algorithm
(see for example [11]) for implementation in the sensors of
the IDS, because we consider this algorithm the best trade-
off between accuracy and efficiency. The K-means algo-
rithm is presented in the Fig. 2.
Figure 2. The K-means algorithm
The input resource access requests are encoded in such
a way that vectors of the same length are produced. The Eu-
clidean metric, given by the following expression, is used in
our system as a distance measure between vectors.
d(X,Y) =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
| xi − yi |2 (1)
where n is the dimension of the vectorsX andY.
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3. The new labelling algorithm
Having obtained clusters from the sensors, the task of the
assessors is to label them, i.e. to determine which clus-
ters correspond to ”normal” behaviour, and which to ”ab-
normal”. Since there is no learning on labelled data in the
system, the assessors must use other criteria to decide on
this. A common assumption is that few anomalies are ex-
pected in the clustering results, so a significant difference in
cardinalities of the clusters naturally labels the cluster with
the greatest cardinality as that corresponding to ”normal”
behaviour. However, there are at least two problems related
to such a strategy [18]: first, normal data transmitted by
means of a less frequently used protocol (such as ftp or tel-
net) might produce clusters of very different cardinalities,
which could mislead such an assessor. Second, there are
some Denial-of-Service attacks, such as syn-Flood, that can
mislead this labelling strategy by making the mathematical
expectation of the attack much greater than that of a ”nor-
mal” behaviour. To overcome the problems related to the
labelling strategy described above, we propose a combina-
tion of clustering evaluation techniques to be used in the
assessors of the IDS.
General clustering evaluation measures defined in the
literature can be implemented in intrusion detection sys-
tems relatively easily. All these measures opt for detecting
well separated and compact clusters. The following clus-
tering evaluation measures are often used: Silhouette index,
Dunn’s index, Davies-Bouldin index, etc. [2, 10]. In order
to present the definition of the Davies-Bouldin index, we
first have to define the inter-cluster and intra-cluster dis-
tance.
Inter-cluster distance
The inter-cluster distance is a measure of separation be-
tween clusters. The most frequently used measures of this
kind are: single linkage, complete linkage, average link-
age, centroid linkage, average of centroids linkage, Haus-
dorff metrics, etc.
Intra-cluster distance
The intra-cluster distance is a measure of compactness of
clusters. The following are the most frequently used intra-
cluster distances: complete diameter, average diameter and
centroid diameter.

Our choice for the IDS assessing algorithm is the
Davies-Bouldin index combined with the centroid diame-
ters comparison between clusters. Besides, in the compu-
tation of the Davies-Bouldin index, the centroid linkage
is used as the inter-cluster distance. The centroid inter-
cluster and intra-cluster measures are selected for compat-
ibility with the K-means clustering algorithm used in the
sensors (which essentially computes centroids of clusters at
each iteration).
The Davies-Bouldin index is selected because of the fol-
lowing advantages over other measures:
1. Stability of results: this index is less sensitive to the
position of a small group of data set members (so
called outliers) than other measures, such as for ex-
ample, the Dunn’s index [10].
2. In the case of more than 2 clusters and the need
to rank them, some measures (for example the Sil-
houette index) behave unpredictably, whereas the ex-
pected behavior of the Davies-Bouldin index in those
cases is good [2].
Let Xτ = {X1, . . . ,XN} be the data set and let
C = (C1, . . . , CK) be its clustering into K clusters. Let
d(Xk,Xl) be the distance between Xk and Xl. Then
the Davies-Bouldin index is defined in the following way
[2, 10]:
DB(C) = 1
K
K∑
i=1
max
i=j
{
Δ(Ci) + Δ(Cj)
δ(Ci, Cj)
}
. (2)
where Δ(Ci) is the intra-cluster distance and δ(Ci, Cj) is
the inter-cluster distance. In the observed IDS, the centroid
diameter is used for Δ(Ci). It is defined in the following
way [2]:
Δ(Ci) = 2
(∑
Xk∈Ci d(Xk, sCi)
| Ci |
)
, i = 1, . . .K, (3)
where sCi =
1
| Ci |
∑
Xk∈Ci
Xk.
The centroid linkage inter-cluster distance is used for
δ(Ci, Cj). It is defined in the following way [2]:
δ(Ci, Cj) = d(sCi , sCj ), (4)
where sCi =
1
| Ci |
∑
Xk∈Ci
Xk and sCj =
1
| Cj |
∑
Xk∈Cj
Xk.
For the remainder of this paper, we shall limit ourselves
to studying the 2 clusters case, of which one corresponds
to ”normal” and the other to ”abnormal” behaviour in the
corresponding network. This is done primarily because of
an easier comparison with the cardinality based labelling al-
gorithm during the experiments. In addition, whatever the
number of clusters we use in the sensors, we must finally
decide which of them will be considered ”normal”, leading
us to a case with 2 ”superclusters”.
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In the experiments, we compare the results obtained
with our assessing algorithm with the results obtained with
the clusters cardinalities criterion, a common measure for
assessing IDS clusters (see for example [18]). We define
this criterion in the following way:
LetXτ = {X1, . . . ,XN} be the current data set and let
Ck,τ = {Yk,τ ,Zk,τ} be the partition of Xτ into 2 clusters,
obtained in the sensor Pk. Let λj ∈ {1, 2} be the label of
the vector Xj in the data set Xτ , where λj = 1 is inter-
preted as ”normal” behaviour. If | Yk,τ |≥| Zk,τ | +DC ,
where DC is a threshold given in advance then λj = 1 for
Xj ∈ Yk,τ and λj = 2 otherwise. If | Zk,τ |≥| Yk,τ |
+DC , then λj = 1 forXj ∈ Zk,τ and λj = 2 otherwise.
The main idea of our clusters labelling algorithm, which
uses the Davies-Bouldin index and centroid diameters of the
clusters is the following:
The attack vectors are often mutually very similar, if not
identical. For example, the corresponding cluster in the case
of a massive attack is extremely compact and the Davies-
Bouldin index of such a clustering is either 0 (when the
non-attack cluster is empty) or very close to 0. Having in
mind the expected mutual similarity among attack vectors,
the centroid diameter of the attack cluster is expected to be
smaller than that of the non-attack cluster. In the excep-
tional case in which one of the clusters is empty, relabelling
is performed if the Davies-Bouldin index of the clustering is
equal to 0 and the centroid diameter of the cluster labelled
with ”2” is equal to 0. Thus lower values of the Davies-
Bouldin index indicate the existence of a massive attack,
whereas small values of the centroid diameter in these cases
indicate the attack cluster.
By contrast, when the Davies-Bouldin index takes
higher values, i.e. where massive attacks do not exist, the
centroid diameter of the cluster labelled with ”1” is expected
to be smaller than that of the cluster labelled with ”2”, be-
cause in those cases the non-emptiness of the latter cluster
is a rare event and it can even be a consequence of an error
caused by the very clustering method implemented in the
system.
Example 1: In the KDD CUP data set, many attack vec-
tors correspond to the so called ”smurf” attack, which is a
sort of DoS attack. Table 1 shows the differences between
the coordinates of two attack vectors that correspond to the
”smurf” attack. Table 2 shows the differences between two
”normal” vectors. In this particular example it is easy to
see that the difference between two attack vectors is much
smaller than the difference between two ”normal” vectors.
The study above gives rise to the following labelling al-
gorithm:
Algorithm 1
Input:
• A clustering C of N vectors into 2 clusters, C1 and
C2, in which the vectors belonging to the ”non-
attack” cluster C1 take the label ”1”, and those be-
longing to the ”attack” cluster C2 take the label ”2”.
• The Davies-Bouldin index threshold, ΔDB .
• The centroid diameters difference thresholds, ΔCD1
and ΔCD2 .
Table 1. The differences between two attack vectors in
the KDD CUP data base (records 7635 and 7636 of the
reduced (10%) data set). The rest of 41 coordinates
are equal to 0.
Coord. id. Rec. 7635 Rec. 7636
protocol type 2 2
service 50001 50001
flag 10 10
src bytes 1032 1032
count 511 511
srv count 511 511
same srv rate 100 100
dst host count 228 238
dst host srv count 83 93
Table 2. The differences between two ”normal” vec-
tors in the KDD CUP data base (records 6 and 7 of the
reduced (10%) data set). The rest of 41 coordinates
are equal to 0.
Coord. id. Rec. 6 Rec. 7
service 80 80
flag 10 10
src bytes 212 159
dst bytes 1940 4087
logged in 1 1
count 1 5
srv count 2 5
same srv rate 100 100
srv diff host rate 100 0
dst host count 1 11
dst host srv count 69 79
dst host same srv rate 100 100
dst host same src port rate 100 0

Output:
• The eventually relabelled input clustering, if rela-
belling conditions are met.
begin
db ←− DaviesBouldinIndex(C) ;
cd1 ←− CentroidDiameter(C1) ;
cd2 ←− CentroidDiameter(C2) ;
/** Condition 1 **/
if (db = 0) and (cd2 = 0) then
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Relabel(C)
/** Condition 2 **/
else if (db < ΔDB) and (cd1 + ΔCD2 < cd2) then
Relabel(C)
/** Condition 3 **/
else if (db > ΔDB) and (cd1 > cd2 + ΔCD1) then
Relabel(C) ;
end.
procedure Relabel(Clustering C)
begin
forall vectors in C
if label of the vector is ’1’ set it to ’2’
and vice versa ;
end.

Example 2: The Algorithm 1 applied to the first 20000
records of the reduced (10%) KDD CUP data set, upon clus-
tering by the 2-means algorithmwhere N = 1000, produces
no labelling errors at all in spite of a very bad initial (i.e.
as-clustered) labelling on average. The parameters of the
Algorithm 1 are the following: ΔDB = 0.45, ΔCD1 = 500
and ΔCD2 = 0. The results are summarized in the Table 3.
Table 3. Application of the Algorithm 1 to the first
20000 records of the reduced (10%) KDD CUP data
set. The first row of the table corresponds to the
records 1-1000 of the KDD CUP data base, the second
row corresponds to the records 1001-2000 and so on.
DB CD1 CD2 No. of Relab.
index attacks cond.∗
1.13 32759.24 7108.57 0 3
0.93 17273.10 5216.10 0 3
0.88 16233.92 4771.84 0 3
0.80 50253.55 6979.75 2 3
1.47 76357.90 7273.81 0 3
0.96 4344.63 14158.54 0 0
0.74 7488.44 85018.59 0 0
0.14 69.60 7096.34 376 2
0.00 25.19 0.00 1000 1
0.00 11.38 0.00 1000 1
0.00 0.02 0.00 1000 1
0.15 190.27 7302.86 321 2
1.19 33783.03 5843.60 0 3
1.01 5063.81 22257.14 0 0
0.97 243757.28 8973.01 0 3
1.33 18070.60 8785.56 21 3
1.03 18289.63 5227.67 0 3
1.16 4863.57 22460.80 0 0
1.03 36749.24 6909.28 0 3
0.17 8149.70 423.70 99 0
∗ See Algorithm 1; 0 means that the initial (as clustered) labelling is
correct so no relabelling is performed by the Algorithm 1
The behaviour of the Algorithm 1 depends on the choice
of the parameters ΔDB , ΔCD1 and ΔCD2 . These should
be determined in advance. One of the ways to do that is
to use a network/dataset with known relevant characteris-
tics, of which the most important ones are the base rate, i.e.
the probability of the attack (which influences the Davies-
Bouldin index of the clustering) and the type of the attack
(which influences the centroid diameters of the clusters dur-
ing the attacks). For example, the KDD CUP data set has
the base rate of ≈ 80% and of all the attacks in that dataset
≈ 99% are denial-of-service (DoS) attacks [20]. For a
dataset of such characteristics, the best performance of the
Algorithm 1 has been obtained by setting the values of the
parameters to those used in the Example 2. In a real net-
work, one could start with the parameters of the Algorithm 1
obtained in the controlled network scenario (e.g. with those
obtained with the KDD CUP database) and then try to fine
tune the parameters over time. However, the choice of the
parameters suitable for a particular network may be a real
challenge, since we cannot completely control the base rate
and the type of attacks.
4. Experimental work
Extensive simulation of the basic sensor-assessor structure
of a multiple classifier IDS has been carried out in order to
study its response to the attack data. To this end, the follow-
ing instance of this structure has been built:
1. In the sensor, the 2-means clustering algorithm has
been implemented.
2. Two types of assessors have been tested:
2.1 Cardinality based assessor: the cluster of
greater cardinality is considered ”normal” and
is labelled with ’1’. The minimum difference
DC between clusters’ cardinalities needed to re-
label the clustering is used as a parameter of this
assessing algorithm.
2.2 The assessor implementing the Davies-Bouldin
index of the clustering and the clusters’ di-
ameters, according to the Algorithm 1. The
Davies-Bouldin index threshold, ΔDB , and the
centroid diameters difference thresholds, ΔCD1
and ΔCD2 , have been used as parameters of this
assessing algorithm.
Next, an input data source had to be selected. This task
is considered difficult. For example, according to [16], this
is one of the challenges of IDS testing. In [16], 4 approaches
to this problem are defined, according to the use of back-
ground traffic in the test data:
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1. testing using no background traffic at all [21];
2. testing using real traffic/logs [22];
3. testing using sanitized traffic/logs [14];
4. testing by generating traffic on a tested network
[3, 4, 13, 19, 21].
Each of these approaches has its advantages and disad-
vantages. The main advantage of testing by generating traf-
fic artificially is the possibility of accurate determination of
the number of false alarms, since no unknown attacks can
appear in the test data. The quality of such a simulated
data source is a separate question. For example, the well
known and widely used KDD CUP source [5, 13] has been
criticized by various authors (see [15, 23], among others).
However, the KDD CUP data set contains many massive at-
tacks (which is typical for a military environment to which
it corresponds) and this is a decisive characteristic needed
for testing the labelling strategy proposed in this paper.
Thus, we have selected the KDD CUP database as the
traffic source for our experiments. The aim was to compare
the results obtained by applying the proposed labelling strat-
egy with those obtained by applying the cardinality based
labelling strategy, with and without the presence of massive
attacks. Because of that, the attacks from the KDD CUP
database were filtered out in the same way as in [18]. The
filtering percentage of 0%, 98% and 99% was used over all
the resource access requests records of the database. With-
out filtering out the attacks (0%), the database simulates
many massive attacks, whereas if the filtering of 98% and
99% of attacks is applied it simulates a ”realistic” situation,
in which attacks are rare events. The effectiveness of the
system was measured by means of the ROC (Receiver Op-
erating Characteristic) curve for the filtered data set men-
tioned above. The ROC curve depicts the relationship be-
tween false positive rate FPR and true positive rate TPR,
where:
FPR =
FP
FP + TN
TPR =
TP
TP + FN
(5)
In the equations above, FP is the number of false posi-
tive outcomes of the intrusion detection on a fixed data set,
i.e. the number of decisions in which a non-existing attack
is signalled, TP is the number of true positive outcomes, i.e.
successful detections, TN is the number of true negative out-
comes, i.e. the number of decisions, in which a non-existing
attack is not signalled, and FN is the number of false neg-
ative outcomes, i.e. the number of decisions, in which an
existing attack is not signalled.
The results concerning the effectiveness of the IDS us-
ing the Algorithm 1 are compared with those obtained with
clusters labelling according to their cardinalities. The com-
parative results are presented in the Fig. 3. By varying the
parameters ΔCD1 and ΔCD2 , the best results with the Al-
gorithm 1 over the KDD CUP database are obtained with
ΔCD1 = 500 and ΔCD2 = 0.
a)
b)
c)
Figure 3. ROCs of the IDS. C - labelling clusters ac-
cording to their cardinality; DB - labelling clusters using
a combination of clustering evaluation techniques (see
text). Attack filtration: a) 0%, b) 98%, c) 99%
The ROC curves labelled with DB from the Fig. 3 are
obtained by setting ΔCD1 = 500 and ΔCD2 = 0 and
by varying only the threshold ΔDB between 0.2 and 0.45,
whereas the ROC curves labelled with C are obtained by
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varying the parameter DC in the clusters cardinalities la-
belling algorithm between 500 and 0. The cardinality of the
data set for clustering was N = 1000 in all the experiments.
From the Fig. 3, it can be observed that without attack
filtering (Fig. 3a), the Algorithm 1 gives very good results,
whereas the clusters labelling algorithm based on cardinal-
ities of the clusters fails completely. With 98% of the at-
tacks from the KDD CUP database filtered out (Fig. 3b),
the behaviour of these two labelling algorithms is exactly
the same, whereas the clusters labelling algorithm based on
cardinalities is somewhat better than the Algorithm 1 if even
more attacks (99%, Fig. 3c) are filtered out from the KDD
CUP database.
The results for FPR and TPR include not only the er-
rors caused by the labelling algorithm, but also the errors
due to clustering itself. Because of this fact, the minimum
values of FPR in the ROC curves from the Fig. 3 are ap-
proximately 6%. This is expected, having in mind that the
IDS is based on clustering only. It is possible to improve
the correctness of the decisions made by the IDS by imple-
menting a more sophisticated clustering algorithm, but in
that case the time complexity of the overall IDS algorithm
would also increase, reducing the overall system efficiency.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, a new clusters labelling strategy has been pro-
posed for application in a multiple classifier intrusion detec-
tion system (IDS). That strategy combines the computation
of the Davies-Bouldin index of the clustering and the com-
parison of centroid diameters of the clusters. The aim of the
labelling algorithm is to detect compact clusters containing
very similar vectors that are highly likely to be attack vec-
tors. By using the proposed labelling algorithm in the as-
sessors, the response of such an IDS to a massive attack
(for example, a Denial-of-Service attack) is significantly
improved. In the experiments, the KDD CUP database has
been used as the traffic source, in spite of all the criticism,
because it is a good source of massive attacks. It has been
shown experimentally, via ROC curves obtained by apply-
ing the IDS over the KDD CUP database, that the proposed
labelling strategy is much better than the classical clusters
labelling algorithm that uses cardinalities of clusters, when
a massive attack is present. Besides, in the absence of mas-
sive attacks, i.e. with the vast majority of attacks (98% and
99%) filtered out from the database, the behaviour of the
proposed assessor is similar to that of the classical asses-
sor based on cardinalities of clusters. By selecting properly
the parameters of the proposed clusters labelling algorithm,
such an IDS can be adapted to the properties of any network.
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